A note to my readers

This is a note to whoever reads this blog about my status.

It has been a long ride, and I am trying to get back to writing on here. I have some drafts in the making, but it will probably be a while before I can be a fully-fledged writer. I, along with my family, have a frequently busy and sometimes hard life, and I’m trying not to get “burned-out” or overburdened.

So, with that in mind, here’s my agenda:

-Philosophical stuff, namely epistemology, religion, ethics, political philosophy and science

-Upgrading this site to a better form

-Development of a personal site and YouTube channel for further discussion of these things and more

-Eventually, writing some books on these topics and some fiction, like sci-fi and novels about interesting – and sinister – things of my life

Feel free to offer your two cents on the above. Follow me (if you’re not already doing so) for more info on these and other things




Frege’s argument for platonism


0. Introduction

Contemporary platonism (with a small ‘p’) can trace its roots back to Frege, in particular to his 1918 paper Thought. There are many fascinating arguments and proposals in this paper, which is one of the richest in the early analytic tradition. In particular, I want to look at one argument, which is broadly contained within pages 298 and 302. The argument is basically that communication (and science generally) would be impossible if platonism were not true; and clearly communication is possible, so platonism is true. What needs to be defended is the first premise, which links the possibility of communication with platonism. This is what Frege explains in the section I want to focus on.

  1. Thoughts and Propositions 

Frege is setting the scene for 20th century philosophy of language by giving us a very vivid account of a the notion of a proposition. Frege does not use…

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Skepticism, fallibilism, anti-skepticism

(This is something I’ve been interested in for a long time and so am sharing in lieu of an actual post. Feel free to elaborate, offer an expansion, or your two cents on this, as I plan to do so in future posts. ~ Henry James Anderson)


    0. Introduction

The following three propositions form an inconsistent triad:

P)   I do not know that I’m not in the matrix*

Q)   I know that X

R)   If I know that X, then I know that I am not in the matrix

(X is to be thought of as a proposition with content about the external world, such as ‘it is 3PM’ or ‘I am wearing trousers’, etc, rather than ‘I believe it is 3PM’ or ‘I am receiving sense-data about wearing trousers’, whose content is internal to the subject.)

We can represent the logical form of the propositions as follows, where p = ‘I know I am not in the matrix’, and q = ‘I know that X’:

P)    ~p

Q)     q

R)     q → p

There are three ways that we can formulate an argument using these propositions which generate three positions…

View original post 658 more words